But the concern would be: you cannot withdraw, it is too big a step; so there is, as it were, a clamp put on.
The other way of viewing the 2015 Act is to say: given that that is a legal construct, given that that is a court imposing, as it were, through a process of implication on Parliament an intention, that must be inherently subject to change if the legislation changes.
Take, by way of example, suppose a year after CRAG with all its nuanced schemes of control about ratification, CRAG had been repealed. What would be the effect? The effect would be that the prerogative powers on ratification could continue to be exercised, but now no longer subject to the constraints that Parliament had seen fit to impose in CRAG. You can approach, we respectfully submit as our alternative submission, the 2015 Act in a similar way. You can say: well, there is the 2015 Act, even if by necessary implication if you viewed it in isolation, I am leaving entirely out of account the latest legislation, but even if that is the prima facie conclusion on 1972, that must be inherently susceptible to change. The 2015 Act comes in and its legal effect is to leave or to remove, if you will, by the same process, by exactly the same process of implication, that which you impose by necessary implication now comes off by virtue of the same process.