Certainly at that stage it would be. But at that stage -- that is why I said either or both, because the political answer says ultimately, as its punch line: this is for Parliament to decide and not for courts to trespass on as part of our constitutional arrangements; this one ascribes a legal effect and is therefore of course for the courts to determine.
That is the third submission, which has gone on for a very long time and contains lots of little submissions within it. Apologies for the numbering.
The fourth submission is a shorter one, you will be delighted to hear, which is that the reasoning and conclusion of the divisional court about the statutory scheme has the most serious implications for the usual and long-established exercise by Government of the foreign affairs prerogatives. We have dealt with that in our case particularly at paragraph 61, but you will understand immediately why I say that, because if there is some principle that says whenever you exercise the foreign affairs prerogative, if the consequence is or perhaps may be to have an impact on or even to alter domestic legal rights, you cannot do it, then that is a consequence which is extremely troubling for obvious reasons.
It would be to introduce a much more stringent scheme of control, for example, by reference to a new and newly discovered principle than the scheme that Parliament has seen fit to enact, even in CRAG, with its controls on ratification and the things that need to be done in relation to that. Because the consequence of the divisional court's reasoning on the back of this, if it has an impact on domestic law point, is that you need primary legislation.