All I am saying, my Lord, is that if -- we are looking at a case in front of the Supreme Court. To put a proposition like that when we have the dispensing principle is plainly in my submission not correct. But it gets worse than that, because pages 35 to 43 of the Government's case are entirely taken up -- if there is any doubt that Mr Eadie's raft is the De Keyser principle, it fades away when one sees the heading, "The application of De Keyser's principles", pages 35 to 43.
This case, at least our case on the dispensing principle has nothing to do with the De Keyser line of cases. And we can see then that all the cases the Government puts against us, paragraphs 40, 45 and 55(b) of its case, 56 of its case, have nothing to do with the dispensing principle.
So one goes, for example, to paragraph 40 of the Government's case; it says the exercise of the prerogative can undoubtedly have effects on "the content of domestic law and the extent of individual rights and obligations which have effect in domestic law".
Whether that is right or wrong, none of the cases in paragraph 40(a) to (d) are examples of the prerogative being used to dispense with or even amend a statute.