It is, that is what I was going to say, my Lord. What is said in that case, that it doesn't matter that we think Parliament intends to change this law later, that is constitutionally irrelevant. What Lord Browne-Wilkinson said in the Fire Brigades Union case, at MS 483, is that it is not for the executive to say that provisions of law, inconsistent with the prerogative(?) act would be repealed when a suitable legislative opportunity arises. It is for Parliament and not the executive to repeal or not repeal legislation. It is their choice.
Then we cite the Hayden case, the last line of that citation, whatever the vestige of the dispensing power which remained at the time of the Bill of Rights, it is no more.
The second part of our historical enquiry from paragraph 17 on MS 12486 addresses any distinction that the appellant may seek to draw between the ordinary position in relation to prerogative powers and the foreign relations prerogative, because it may be argued as with the royal prerogative, the royal prerogative can alter the enjoyment of property or may be able to alter the enjoyment of property in certain circumstances; can the foreign relations prerogative do that as an aspect of its content?
But again, we say that the Secretary of State's submission that his power, prerogative power to enter or to withdraw from international legal obligations is entirely untrammelled, simply cannot withstand the historical enquiry which Mr Eadie and I agree is the correct approach to this.
There is a strong line of authority to support the orthodox view that the executive may not, by exercise of its foreign policy powers, vary domestic law or to remove rights.
Again I take that from my written case, it has not been challenged, I will not take you to the underlying cases one by one unless you want me to --